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I. Introduction 
 The Korean War is a watershed event in the history of the People’s Republic of China 
[PRC] and the geopolitics of East Asia, marking the birth of the so-called “blood alliance” 
between China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK], as well as China’s first 
direct military conflict with the United States. Yet despite this historical significance—or perhaps 
because of it—each participant of the war has portrayed the event in a different light, 
maintaining significant propaganda efforts since the beginning of the war. In 1950, the Chinese 
government launched a nationwide propaganda and mobilization movement under the slogan 
“Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” hailing the war a victory against the United States, 
despite its conclusion with an armistice. Peng Dehuai, leading Marshal of the Chinese People’s 
Volunteer Army [PVA], even remarked that “gone for ever [was] the time when the western 
powers have been able to conquer a country in the [Far] East merely by mounting several 
cannons along the coast.”  1
 Notwithstanding Peng’s remark, the Korean War is not yet gone. Without a peace treaty 
to mark its end, the Korean War has “lived” on—but not its original conditions of 1950s-level 
Cold War dynamics. The normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in the 1970s significantly altered 
China’s relations with its Socialist allies and prompted its engagement with non-Socialist states. 
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, which received worldwide criticism since the 1990s, also led 
the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] to reconsider its traditional relations with the DPRK, 
Republic of Korea [ROK], and United States. These changes raise the question: did the CCP 
change its interpretation of the Korean War, the event that started its involvement in the Korean 
 Peng Dehuai, Peng’s speech at the Twenty-fourth Session of the CPGC, Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan [Selected military 1
writings of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Central Archives and Manuscripts Press, 1988), 445, cited in Zhang Shu Guang, Mao’s 
Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 248.
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peninsula, and if so, what does that imply about the CCP’s evolving domestic and regional 
political objectives? 
 While the Korean War and China’s political campaign surrounding it have been studied 
extensively in China and beyond, there have been only limited attempts to understand how the 
Chinese government’s interpretation of the war changed over time. Studying the CCP’s 
interpretation of the Korean War can yield valuable insights about how the party views the 
beginning, development, and future of its relationship with the DPRK, as well as how it positions 
China vis-a-vis other countries involved in the war—the United States, ROK, the Soviet Union 
(USSR, now Russia), and Japan. As a case study of how the CCP crafts official historical 
narratives, the Korean War can also demonstrate how the party communicates to the general 
public its foreign and domestic political agendas through its use of history. 
 This paper therefore studies the CCP’s changing Korean War narrative and associated 
domestic and regional policy objectives. The paper examines anniversary speeches by CCP 
leaders—such as Mao Zedong, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping—from 1950, the 
beginning of the war, to 2010, the year when the last centrally-organized, national-scale Korean 
War commemoration event was held. The speeches are collected primarily from Chinese 
newspapers such as the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily [PLA Daily], 
which, as major media outlets for the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army [PLA], have the 
widest circulation and readership in China. This paper also references speeches or publications in 
selected works of CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.  2
 This paper argues that the CCP used its Korean War narrative as a propaganda tool for 
rallying domestic political support and signaling the CCP’s perception of its relations with the 
 For a full list, please refer to the Primary Source section of the bibliography.2
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DPRK, ROK, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The Korean War narrative had always 
responded to domestic needs, initially focused on consolidating the home front, and later on 
legitimizing the CCP’s political rule. Since 1954, the narrative additionally served as an 
international signaling tool for trumpeting PRC-DPRK relations. This DPRK-oriented message, 
however, decreased in fervor during the Cultural Revolution and later from 1972 with PRC-U.S. 
rapprochement, and from the 1990s the narrative’s international message expanded to 
accommodate differing historical narratives of China’s new partners, such as the ROK. 
 Despite these changes, the CCP maintained its portrayal of the United States as China’s 
opponent, intentional ambivalence on who started the war, justification of China’s intervention as 
protecting China’s national interests, and emphasis on the “correct leadership” by the CCP. These 
consistencies suggest that these messages’ underlying political objectives are still relevant today: 
namely, its perception of rivalry with the United States, conciliatory approach to North Korea, 
the CCP’s political correctness and legitimacy, and importance of buffer states in national 
security. 
 This essay starts with a literature review, identifying relevant studies and their limitations. 
It then looks into Korean War anniversary speeches to complement these limitations, evaluating 
their changes and continuity over time to derive the political message behind the changes and, in 
cases, lack thereof. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of what the 
speeches tell us about the political objectives of the CCP. 
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II. Literature Review 
 Studies on the Korean War have existed since as early as the outbreak of the war itself. 
Considering the vast amount of existing literature, this paper focuses on a selection of topics 
from a combination of Chinese, English, and Korean works: the origins of the war; CCP’s 
historical memory about the war; CCP propaganda and mobilization efforts during the war; and 
the history of PRC-DPRK relations. This review reveals the need for more research on the CCP’s 
usage of the Korean War narrative as a propaganda tool and the party’s underlying domestic and 
international policy objectives during the “afterlife” of the war. To date, to the author’s 
knowledge, no study analyzes the CCP’s Korean War commemoration speeches. 
i) Origins of the Korean War 
 The vast majority of works on the Korean War concentrate on understanding the origins 
of the war. Regarding China, these works aim to answer when China decided to enter the Korean 
War, and what factors were behind such a decision. 
 One of the most groundbreaking works on this topic is Allen S. Whiting’s 1960 book, 
China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War. Whiting notably disagrees with 
the then-popular U.S. understanding of the Korean War as an ideological war and the product of 
the Socialist bloc’s expansionist ambitions. Instead, Whiting adopts a more security-oriented 
approach, claiming that China’s intervention more likely budded from “general concern over the 
range of opportunities within China that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on 
China's doorstep.”  China Crosses the Yalu marks a shift in Korean War research from 3
ideological arguments to security-related analyses about China’s motivation for participating in 
 Allen Suess Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, MacMillan: 1960), 159.3
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the Korean War; however, most of these efforts suffered from a lack of available resources 
because most governmental internal documents on the Korean War remained classified.  4
 When the PRC and Russia declassified some of their high-level confidential documents 
in the 1990s, scholarly work on the topic pivoted toward understanding the high diplomacy and 
decision-making rationale of the three leaders—Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung. In 
their paper “China’s Decision to Enter the War: History Revisited,” Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai 
confirm the importance of security concerns from U.S. encroachment on DPRK-PRC borders in 
Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War.  Hao and Zhai argue that “[i]deology played an 5
important but not an absolute role in Mao’s decision, contrary to the views of most western 
historians over the past three decades.”  S. N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, in 6
their book Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, also argue that Mao entered 
the war due to his perception that the United States’ ultimate goal behind intervening in the 
Korean War was to threaten China.  In Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist 7
Relations in the 1950s, Shen Zhihua additionally states that Mao’s decision was motivated by the 
“Soviet factor,” namely the “compromise of its sovereignty in the Northeast” if the war expanded 
to the Northeastern region of China and the USSR intervened.  All these scholars focus on the 8
Korean War’s foreign policy aspect: namely, the CCP’s perception that participating in the 
Korean War would help protect national interests from the threats posed by the USSR or the 
United States. 
 See, for instance, Melvin Gurtov and Hwang Byong-Moo, China under Threat (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 4
1980).
 Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Devision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly 121 (March 5
1990), 94-115.
 Ibid., 114-115.6
 S. N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: 7
Stanford University Press, 1993), 159.
 Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s (Milton Park, Abingdon; New 8
York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 175-6.
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 Some studies, on the other hand, try to bring light to non-security-related factors behind 
the CCP’s decision-making. Chen Jian argues in his book China’s Road to the Korean War that 
“China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than 
safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border.”  Instead, Chen claims that “three fundamental and 9
interrelated rationales had dominated Beijing’s formulation of foreign policy and security 
strategy: the party’s revolutionary nationalism, its sense of responsibility toward an Asian-wide 
or worldwide revolution, and its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese 
revolution.”  By focusing on the CCP’s self-perception of its ideology and world position, Chen 10
highlights the role of the CCP’s domestic motivations to participate in the Korean War. For 
instance, Chen concludes that CCP propaganda during the war aimed at “chang[ing] the external 
pressure caused by the Korean crisis into a driving force for promoting the continuation of the 
great Chinese revolution.”  By elucidating more domestically-driven objectives behind China’s 11
intervention, Chen ties the Korean War directly with domestic political ideology as opposed to 
the CCP’s international threat perception. 
 While these works collectively help trace the motivations behind China’s entering the 
Korean War, their focus on high politics and the CCP’s internal decision-making process bars 
them from studying the ways in which CCP leaders communicated their goals to the masses. A 
handful of studies that looked into CCP propaganda efforts, such as Whiting’s and Chen’s works, 
demonstrate how such propaganda reflected and communicated the party’s objectives to the 
domestic public; they are, however, very limited in their time scopes, not covering the changes of 
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CCP perception and objectives toward North Korea in the afterlife of the war. 
ii) China’s Historical Memory of the Korean War 
 Another significant portion of literature addresses historical memory and commemoration 
in China. By studying major creators (and creations) of historical memory such as museums, 
veterans, and textbooks, these studies describe the CCP’s efforts to use China’s history toward its 
political goals and how these goals changed over time.  12
 Among scholars studying the CCP’s historical commemoration of the Korean War, Jung 
Keun-Sik notably researched the Memorial of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, 
China’s predominant museum on the Korean War, tracing its creation and its historical 
narrative.  Jung states that the construction of the Memorial was “most significant within the 13
context of state formation and nation building in China, rather than in the context of international 
politics,” highlighting the domestic propagandistic value that the war holds for the CCP.  14
Regardless of this primary emphasis on domestic factors, Jung also notes that the CCP used the 
war to position China vis-a-vis the United States and DPRK by underlining the “friendship” 
between the Chinese and North Korean people while attempting to shift Chinese domestic 
 This study focuses on works pertinent to the Korean War. Some works that are not covered by this paper but are regardless 12
significant in this field include Neil J. Diamant, Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families, and the Politics of Patriotism in 
China, 1949-2007 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publications, 2010); Neil J. Diamant, “Veterans, Organization, and the 
Politics of Martial Citizenship in China,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no, 1 (2008): 119-158, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
23418654; Neil J. Diamant and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Veterans’ Political Activism in China,” Modern China 41, no. 3 (2015): 
278-312, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24575609; and Hung Chang-tai, “The Cult of the Red Martyr: Politics of Commemoration 
in China,” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 2 (2008): 279-304, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30036507.
 Jung Keun-Sik, “China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U.S. 13
Aggression and Aid Korea,’” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, no. 14 (March 2015), 63-90. For studies 
that include analyses of Korean War exhibition halls in larger museums, please refer to: Kirk A. Denton, Exhibiting the Past : 
Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014); 
Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 
1987-1997,” The China Quarterly, no. 161 (2000): 279-293, https://www.jstor.org/stable/655990; and Edward Vickers, 
“Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education 37, no. 3 (June 2007): 
365-382, DOI: 10.1080/03057920701330255.
 Jung, “China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U.S. Aggression 14
and Aid Korea,” 70.
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perception of the United States from a subject of “worship” and “fear” to a target of 
“resistance.”  Jung thus highlights the Korean War’s propaganda value for the CCP, both in 15
terms of domestic nation-building and international positioning. 
 Another group of literature focuses on the CCP’s use of textbooks to shape historical 
memory regarding the two Koreas. For instance, Yu Yong-Tae studies Chinese history textbooks 
from 1997 to 2001 and argues that China has attempted to accommodate South Korea’s 
perspectives after the Cold War, even when doing so would conflict with North Korea’s views.  16
On the other hand, Yu mentions that while the Chinese government did not characterize the war 
as a “liberation war” as the North Korean government does, it nonetheless opted for a limited 
adoption of the North Korean perspective by not mentioning who started the war (DPRK) and 
emphasizing the United States as an invader.  Yu also highlights that by trumpeting the Korean 17
War as a massive success, the Chinese government aims at relieving Chinese students’ fear of the 
United States and strengthening their nationalist sentiments.  18
 All of these works prove the CCP’s active use of the Korean War’s historical narrative to 
bolster its political goals, while underscoring key components of that narrative such as the 
portrayal of the United States as an “invader” or the deliberately ambiguous description of who 
started the war. These studies, however, suggest several limitations of studying memorials or 
textbooks. With long timeframes in between renovations—at times shut down for years—the 
memorial is not fit for fast updates reflecting changes in CCP objectives. As Jung notes, that the 
memorial is open to visitors of all nationalities additionally compromises the memorial’s 
 Ibid., 72-73.15
 Yu Yong-Tae 유용태, “Jungguk yeoksagyogwaseoui hyeondaesa insikgwa gukgajuui: hyeondae hanguksareul jungsimeuro” 중16
국 역사교과서의 현대사 인식과 국가주의: 현대 한국사를 중심으로 [Modern History Awareness and Nationalism in Chinese 
History Textbooks: Focusing on Modern Korean History], The Korean History Education Review 84 (December 2002): 187-222.
 Ibid, 210.17
 Ibid., 213.18
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usability as a domestic propaganda tool.  Meanwhile, research on textbooks cover few editions 19
of textbooks, providing only a partial picture of the CCP’s historiography of the Korean War. The 
audience of the medium is another limiting factor. Textbooks are geared toward students, which 
limits their circulation within the broader society and potentially in content to render them more 
accessible, thus failing to represent the CCP’s national propaganda strategy. 
iii) Chinese Propaganda Efforts during the Korean War 
 Studies on Chinese propaganda and mobilization efforts during the Korean War focus 
mainly on how the CCP used the Korean War as propaganda material to bolster its contemporary 
political objectives while garnering domestic support to continue war efforts. Several studies 
investigate public responses to CCP propaganda, what existing public sentiment the CCP 
harnessed, and the long-term social implications of the propaganda efforts. 
 One of the seminal English works in this field is Hajimu Masuda’s Cold War Crucible: 
The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World.  Masuda notes that the Chinese masses linked their 20
bitterness toward Japan with their attitude toward the United States, a sentiment that the CCP 
actively kindled to mobilize the Chinese people during the Korean War. Masuda also describes 
how the Chinese masses and the state jointly used the Korean War to “purify” the community, 
eliminating dissent according to their imagined Cold War reality. Masuda thus emphasizes both 
the Korean War’s usefulness to the CCP for domestic consolidation and, in turn, the difficult 
political context in which the party decided to enter the Korean War. 
 Additional studies on Korean War propaganda have mainly been conducted by Chinese 
 Ibid., 67.19
 Hajimu Masuda, Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 20
University Press, 2015).
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scholars. For instance, in his 2015 study, Zhang Fang investigates methods of media control 
adopted by the CCP during the Korean War, highlighting the centralized and propagandized 
nature of news production to ensure that news coverage fit the CCP’s political needs.  Studies 21
by Lin Weijing in 2005 and 2007 similarly outline mobilization tactics, content, and methods, 
including portraying the United States forces as “invaders,” heightening national pride, and 
trumpeting war martyrs and heroes, all as means of encouraging further public participation in 
the Korean War efforts.  22
 Another important study is Song Jin’s research on Deng Xiaoping’s interpretation of the 
Korean War.  Song studies characterizations of the Korean War in the Selected Works of Deng 23
Xiaoping, identifying themes including the essence of the war, comparison of power between the 
United States and China, the righteousness of the cause of war, the source of China's threat, and 
lessons for building Chinese military today.  This study is one of the very few attempts to 24
understand CCP leaders’ changing interpretations of the Korean War over time, and is especially 
 Zhang Fang 张放, “Chaoxian zhanzheng zhong de Zhongguo xinwen shengchan (1950 ~ 1953)” 朝鲜战争中的中国新闻生产21
（1950～1953）[Chinese newspaper production during the Korean War (1950 ~ 1953)], Dangshi Yanjiu yu Jiaoxue 党史研究与
教学, no. 5 (2015): 10-28.
 Lin Weijing 林伟京, “<Renmin ribao> yu kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng zhongde zhengzhidongyuan” 《人民日报》与抗美22
援朝战争中的政治动员 [People’s Daily and Political Mobilization during the War to Resist U.S.Aggression and Aid Korea], 
Journal of Jiangxi Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) 江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) 3 (2007): 
112-116; Lin Weijing 林伟京, “Shixi kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng zhong zhengzhi dongyuande neirong yu fangfa” 试析抗美
援朝战争中政治动员的内容与⽅法 [Analysis of Content and Methods of Political Mobilization during the War to Resist U.S. 
Aggression and Aid Korea], Journal of South China Normal University (Social Science Edition) 华南师范⼤学学报(社会科学
版) 6 (2005): 140-142.
 Examples of such studies include Ye Rentao 叶任涛, “Mao Zedong yu kang Mei yuan Chao” 毛泽东与抗美援朝 [Mao 23
Zedong and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], Corpus of Party History 党史⽂汇 12 (2000): 12-15; Wu 
Xiaobao 吴⼩宝, “Zhou Enlai dui kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng suozuo de zhongyao gongxian” 周恩来对抗美援朝战争所作
的重要贡献 [Zhou Enlai’s Major Contribution to the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], Journal of Zhangzhou 
Vocational University 漳州职业⼤学学报 4 (2001): 9-13; and Zhang Min and Zhang Xiujuan, Zhou Enlai yu kang Mei yuan 
Chao zhan zheng 周恩来与抗美援朝战争 [Zhou Enlai and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], 1st edition 
(Shanghai, China: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000).
 Song Jin, “Deng Xiaoping guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao de ruogan shidian tanxi” 邓⼩平关于抗美援朝的若⼲视点探析 24
[Analysis of Deng Xiaoping’s View on the Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], Military Historical Research 军
事历史研究 1 (2001): 28-35.
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valuable in that it studies the 1970s and 1980s, a time of political limbo when PRC-U.S. and 
PRC-ROK relations were both in flux. 
 These studies all offer detailed insights about the CCP’s propaganda efforts, their key 
themes and messages, and underlying political objectives. Combined, they lay the foundation of 
further analysis of propaganda speeches, allowing for comparison between wartime propaganda 
and later propaganda efforts through commemoration. Their major limitation is, again, their 
timeframe—the analyses do not extend beyond the wartime years, leaving the propaganda value 
of the Korean War in its afterlife insufficiently researched. 
iv) Historical PRC-DPRK Relations 
 The last body of literature studies the history of PRC-DPRK relations. Publications on 
this critical topic are surprisingly scarce, mostly due to the lack of reliable sources as North 
Korean archives remain inaccessible to foreign scholars. The most seminal research on the topic 
is Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng’s A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and 
Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949-1976, a detailed analysis of PRC-DPRK relations from the 
foundation of the PRC in 1949 to the end of Mao’s rule in 1976.  Shen and Xia argue that “the 25
Sino-North Korean special relationship can be traced to 1958, when the Chinese People’s 
Volunteer Army withdrew from North Korea.”  Shen and Xia divides the 27 years into six time 26
periods, based on the ebbs and flows of high-level diplomacy between the PRC and DPRK: (i) 
1950 to 1953, when the two countries experienced tensions due to the Korean War and their 
differing national interests; (ii) 1953 to 1956, when Kim’s aspirations for more independence 
 Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations, 25
1949-1976 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018).
 Ibid., 4.26
  Han 14
clashed with Mao’s intention to keep North Korea as a vassal and protectorate; (iii) 1957 to 
1960, when Mao, to bolster China’s rising international recognition in the Socialist bloc, tried to 
draw Kim closer and started the so-called “special relationship”; (iv) 1961 to 1965, when Kim 
balanced his relations with the USSR and PRC during the Sino-Soviet split to extract aid, while 
China was willing to strengthen PRC-DPRK ties to solidify its own leadership in the Socialist 
bloc; (v) 1965 to 1969, when PRC-DPRK ties cooled during the Cultural Revolution and China’s 
self-imposed isolation; and (vi) 1970 to 1976, when China initially attempted to revive its ties 
with DPRK to counter tensions with the USSR, but détente with the United States ended up 
rupturing the “special” PRC-DPRK ties.  27
 Shen and Xia’s work is a rarity. There are virtually no authoritative works on PRC-DPRK 
relations during the 1980s, due to lack of archival resources. The 1990s onwards, on the other 
hand, suffer from a lack of consensus, with varying political speculations and diplomatic debates 
on China’s intentions toward North Korea amid international efforts to curb the latter’s nuclear 
program and dictatorship. With no conclusive answer, the PRC’s objectives toward DPRK 
remains a hotly debated topic. 
 While limited in its timeframe, the existing works nonetheless provide background 
knowledge critical for understanding PRC-DPRK relations and contextualizing any propaganda 
messages crafted during the periods covered. Speculations on what PRC-DPRK relations would 
have been during the 1980s and beyond, while not as authoritative in their assertions, would 
regardless provide a good background for interpreting and evaluating the messages in CCP 
speeches during these years. 
 Ibid., 8-11.27
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 Existing studies on the Korean War thus highlight the multiplicity of motivations behind 
the CCP’s decision to intervene in the Korean War, including domestic goals of consolidating 
political control, and international goals of gaining global prestige and protecting national 
security from external threat. Research on Korean War commemoration suggests that the 
political propagandist value of the war continues into the modern day, and analyses of wartime 
propaganda strategies confirm that the CCP used the war as a political tool for domestic 
mobilization and consolidation. 
 With the significance, in turn, comes a need. The outsized emphasis on the war and its 
immediate aftermath results in gaps in research on the decades that follow. Museums and 
textbooks, the main sources in extant scholarship, are imperfect case studies due to their lagging 
responsiveness and narrow audience, respectively. Research on PRC-DPRK relations is 
fragmented and incomplete, which all the more emphasizes a need for further research on the 
matter. With this need in mind, this paper explores a new source—CCP commemoration 
speeches on the Korean War—to better understand the propagandist value that the war holds for 
the party and the contemporary domestic and international goals that the party aimed at 
achieving through propaganda. With the relative consistency in which Korean War 
commemoration events had been held for the past 60 years, this paper complements the 
fragmented timelines of existing research and offers new insights by tapping into a medium 
which has not been extensively researched. 
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III. CCP Commemoration Speeches, 1950 - 2010 
 A close analysis of CCP commemoration speeches suggests that the Korean War narrative 
was indeed a multifaceted, malleable propaganda tool for the CCP to bolster domestic and 
international objectives. Since its inception, the Korean War narrative served as a domestic 
propaganda tool for rallying domestic support for the CCP, although the specific projects the 
party tried supporting through the war changed over time. Internationally, the war narrative had 
served as a means of signaling CCP support of the PRC’s diplomatic partners, initially focusing 
on the DPRK and later accommodating new partners such as the United States, ROK, and 
Russia. 
i) 1950 - 1953: War Period 
 The years 1950 to 1953 set the initial discourse of the Korean War, including the basic 
terminology, the general structure of the narrative on the war’s progress and China’s interests, 
and the major takeaways from the war. 
 One key notion was that the United States was an “imperialist” power threatening other 
countries’ sovereignty, including that of China. A June 1950 article by Mao Zedong in the 
People’s Daily called for the people to unite and prepare for any U.S. provocations, labeling the 
United States as an “imperialist power” for its interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries.  In his speech on October 24, 1951, Peng Zhen, Vice Chairman of the Chinese 28
People’s Committee to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, further elaborated this sentiment 
 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Tuanjie qilai dabai Meidiguozhuyi de renhe tiaoxin” 团结起来打败美帝国主义的任何挑衅 [Unite and 28
defeat any provocations from U.S. imperialism], in Jian guo yi lai Mao Zedong jun shi wen gao 建国以来毛泽东军事文稿 [The 
military manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Nation], 1st ed, vol. 1 (Beijing, China: Jun shi ke xue chu ban she, 
2010), 154-5.
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by calling the United States “invaders,” charging them of, among other misdeeds, crossing the 
38th Parallel into North Korean territory, “occupying” Taiwan, and crossing into China’s 
airspace.  29
 In contrast, China was framed as a peace-cherishing nation that only entered the war due 
to U.S. aggression. Mao, in his 1951 article, stated that “[w]e do not invade any nation; we only 
oppose imperialists’ invasions into our country.”  Peng’s speech similarly noted how the “U.S. 30
imperialists” delayed negotiations and continued their “desperate advance,” leading to the need 
to continue the “Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.”  31
 While the United States was depicted as the invader, there was lack of emphasis on South 
Korea’s role in the war. Indeed, most commemoration speeches did not even mention South 
Korea; Mao’s article reflecting on the Korean War’s significance on September 12, 1953, 
mentioned the “U.S. imperialists” but did not censure other U.S. allies.  When mentioned, these 32
states were labeled as “accomplices” or “puppets,” portrayed as mere pawns of the United 
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States.  The war, thus, was framed as one undertaken by the United States alone. 33
 Another major concept established during this period was the CCP’s dual justification of 
China’s intervention on both realpolitik and ideological grounds to convince the domestic 
population to support the war and the CCP’s leadership. Peng’s 1951 speech, for instance, 
rationalized China’s entering the war through two fronts: necessity to counter U.S. hostility 
toward China and the righteous cause of promoting peace against U.S. imperialist ambitions.  34
Quoting Mao to describe the “U.S. invasion” of not only DPRK but also Taiwan and China’s 
airspace, Peng concluded that China must fight the war to protect the country from direct 
invasion. To Peng, the Korean War was also an ideological attack, as he equated the Chinese 
“success” with proof that the judgments of Mao and Stalin were correct—that is, the Chinese 
efforts to counter “unjust,” invasive ambitions of U.S. imperialism were succeeding due to their 
“just,” ideologically correct nature.  This ideological argument was reflected in the CCP’s 35
characterization of the United States, which was purportedly a “paper tiger” that was “strong on 
the outside, weak on the inside” since it lacked the political correctness that the PRC and USSR 
enjoyed.  Mao, in his 1953 article, similarly described the lesson of the war as follows: “by 36
relying on the people, and a relatively correct leadership, we can use our inferior materiel to 
 See, for instance, “Zai shoudu qingzhu zhiyuanjun chuguo zuozhan liangzhounian dahui shang  kang Mei yuan Chao zonghui 33
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会词 [Opening Speech by Zhang Xiruo, Standing Committee member of Chinese People’s Committee to Resist U.S. Aggression 
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triumph over enemies with superior materiel.”  The political connection here was obvious: it 37
was the CCP’s correct leadership and political will under Socialist ideology that led to China’s 
victory of the Korean War. With the United States described as inferior to China in terms of 
political correctness and (consequentially) actual military might, Communist China was 
portrayed as a victorious challenger of the United States. 
 Unlike with the United States, however, the CCP did not attempt to differentiate itself 
from its communist allies: the USSR and DPRK. All speeches from these years described the war 
as a joint victory with the North Korean military, even while emphasizing domestic 
accomplishments under the Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.  Peng’s 1951 38
speech lauded the role of the Soviet Union as the leader of the international Socialist bloc, stating 
that “during the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the Chinese people of all 
classes . . . recognized the peaceful, democratic countries and people worldwide who cherish 
 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Kang Mei yuan Chao de shengli he yiyi” 抗美援朝的胜利和意义 [The significance of the victory of 37
the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea], September 12, 1953, in Jian guo yi lai Mao Zedong jun shi wen gao 建国以来
毛泽东军事文稿 [The military manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Nation], 1st ed, vol. 2 (Beijing, China: Jun 
shi ke xue chu ban she, 2010), 174-175.
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peace, led by the Soviet Union.”  39
 Overall, these speeches established the basis of the subsequent Korean War rhetoric. The 
antagonistic positioning of the United States vis-a-vis China, emphasis on U.S. “aggression” and 
China’s “forced” entry into war as a peace-loving nation, and calls to unite under the righteous 
CCP leadership, were all seen in later speeches. 
 What differentiated the wartime years, however, was the CCP’s mainly domestic focus in 
its Korean War narrative. The realpolitik argument of China being under U.S. siege was 
consistently invoked, arguing that mainland China was protected by fighting the Korean War, as 
suggested in the full name of the movement: Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Protect the 
Home and the Nation. Other countries such as the USSR and DPRK were merely acknowledged 
as partner nations, suggesting that the Korean War narrative bore more value for domestic 
rallying through an invocation of an enemy (the United States) than in international positioning 
of the PRC. Indeed, even the ideological argument of fighting under the righteous cause of 
Socialism that positioned China in the communist bloc tied back to the CCP’s political 
legitimacy and domestic war mobilization efforts. Peng’s speech is an explicit example, calling 
for “eliminating imperialist spies hidden in all corners of China,” and establishing a so-called 
“home front.”  The domestic emphasis reflected the issues the CCP faced in continuing the war: 40
general war fatigue after the Chinese Civil War and the CCP’s still-shaky control over mainland 
China. The Korean War narrative was thus crafted as a propagandist tool to serve the CCP’s 
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political purposes since its inception; it was, however, mainly focused on domestic needs in its 
earlier years. 
ii) 1954 - 1956: Post-War 
 In the years immediately following the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 
1953, there were no reports of domestic, centrally-organized commemoration events offered by 
the CCP. Against the backdrop of contemporary political challenges, the lack of commemoration 
during these years further confirmed the Korean War narrative’s domestic propaganda value, 
while suggesting for the first time its usage for international signaling. 
 The decrease in domestic commemoration since 1953 confirmed that the CCP’s initial 
main purpose of celebrating the war was for domestic wartime mobilization. The events closest 
to central commemoration were those organized by the PVA leadership in Pyongyang in 1954 
and 1955. News coverage of PVA leaders’ speeches, while very short and mainly reiterating 
earlier speeches’ content, newly emphasized the need for the military—and not the Chinese 
people as a whole, unlike previous speeches—to remain “vigilant” and continue fighting until the 
final victory.  This change most likely reflected the reduced necessity to garner war support 41
after the signing of the armistice, which, in turn, decreased the need to commemorate the war. 
The only people who needed to stay mobilized were military personnel, not the Chinese public. 
 The additional decrease in commemoration fervor in 1956, meanwhile, most likely 
reflected the cooling of PRC-DPRK relations that year, suggesting the first use of the Korean 
 “Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun lingdao jiguan juxing dahui jinian kang Mei yuan Chao sizhounian” 中国人民志愿军领导机关41
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War as an international signaling tool. In 1956, there was no central event hosted in Pyongyang, 
with individual troops celebrating the anniversary on their own.  There was one hosted by the 42
DPRK Ambassador to China, but the PLA Daily coverage of the speech delivered by the Chinese 
representative, General Gan Siqi, was merely three lines, reiterating China’s call for vigilance 
amid U.S. and ROK threats of “northern invasion.”  This cooling of celebration fervor was most 43
likely due to Kim Il-sung’s purge of domestic political factions, which left the Chinese 
leadership dissatisfied. Discord worsened in 1956 after failed attempts to weaken Kim’s political 
power by the “Yan’an faction,”  a political faction within the DPRK with ties to Beijing which 
inspired Kim’s massive political purge in August.  The lack of commemoration events in 1956 44
in the usual month of October suggested that the Korean War narrative was actively used by the 
CCP to convey an international message for the first time: discontent toward the DPRK. 
iii) 1957 - 1958: Improving PRC-DPRK Ties 
 The PRC’s Korean War commemoration in 1957 and 1958, in turn, reflected the 
improvement of PRC-DPRK ties, portraying the DPRK as a respectable partner of the PRC. 
Continuation of touting the CCP’s decision to enter the war as “correct,” meanwhile, suggested 
the CCP’s continued use of the narrative for domestic propaganda. 
 In 1957, Mao desired to improve PRC-DPRK ties against the backdrop of the rising 
international status of the PRC. As Shen and Xia describe, Mao believed that “he was much more 
 See, for instance, “Zhiyuanjun jinian kang Mei yuan Chao liuzhounian” 志愿军纪念抗美援朝六周年 [People’s Volunteer 42
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accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/13881798.
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sophisticated theoretically than Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and that therefore the CCP was 
quite qualified to be a coleader [sic] of the socialist camp”; thus, it “became necessary that China 
exhibit some magnanimity toward the DPRK.”  This approach led to improved bilateral 45
communication between the PRC and DPRK during the latter half of 1957. Mao later withdrew 
all PVA forces from the DPRK to accommodate Kim’s desire to unify Korea independently, 
further strengthening their relations.  46
 The CCP ramped up its celebration of the Korean War accordingly. In 1957 October, the 
PVA leadership reinstated its commemoration event in Pyongyang.  Especially important was 47
Commander Yang Yong’s 1958 October report of the PVA’s work to the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference.  48
 In his speech, Yang extensively highlighted the DPRK’s contribution in the war and 
actively positioned China as a respectful partner, unlike previous speeches that focused mainly 
on the domestic implications of the war. Stating that the war “further strengthened . . . the 
traditional friendship between the people of China and North Korea,” Yang equated “the North 
Korean people’s suffering” to “the suffering of our own and all of mankind.”  Yang argued that 49
“the Korean problem [was] one that the Korean people should resolve themselves with no 
foreign interference,” and that the PVA’s withdrawal was a demonstration of China’s respect of 
 Ibid., 111.45
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DPRK sovereignty.  Yang even claimed that the North Korean people’s “brave struggle and 50
sublime patriotism and internationalism educated [the PVA] extremely profoundly.”  Yang 51
conveyed a more equal relationship between the DPRK and PRC, emphasizing the DPRK’s 
wartime contributions and Socialist standing much more extensively than previous speeches. 
 Yang further demonstrated respect toward the DPRK by adopting the DPRK’s war 
narrative into his, delivering the first public speech to state that the Korean War began as an 
invasion from the south orchestrated by the United States. Yang claimed that “the American 
imperialists abetted their follower, the Rhee Syngman clique, and began the long-schemed attack 
on the [DPRK],” deviating from previous CCP narratives that blamed the United States only for 
“meddling with other countries’ internal affairs” and “intruding into North Korean territory” after 
the war began, but never for starting the war itself.  The new narrative came from the DPRK, 52
which had long argued that the war began from a southern invasion. That China openly adopted 
this narrative into its own suggested that the CCP put increased value on PRC-DPRK relations. 
 Nevertheless, domestic propaganda messages remained strong. Yang argued that the 
Korean War proved that “if peace-cherishing people across the world want[ed] to gain peace, 
they need[ed] to take proactive actions to resist violence and stop invasion.”  This reaffirmed 53
the correctness of the CCP’s decision to enter the war; in Yang’s words, “the victory of the 
Korean War [was] the victory of the CCP’s and Chairman Mao’s wise decision, and the victory 
of Chairman Mao Thought.”  While Yang still characterized the Socialist bloc as led by the 54
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Socialist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union.”  By extolling China’s contributions to 55
the international Socialist bloc, the speech not only reflected China’s growing ambition to exert 
more global leadership, but also its growing need for domestic legitimacy in the aftermath of the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957 and its promotion of the Great Leap Forward starting in 
1958. 
 The period 1957 to 1958 evinced an improvement of PRC-DPRK relations after its 
relative cooling during the preceding years. If the year 1958 was the beginning of a “special 
relation” as claimed by Shen and Xia, the speeches indeed suggested an effort to strengthen 
bilateral ties. The international signaling value of the Korean War increased here, with active 
positioning of China vis-a-vis not just the United States but also North Korea. The war’s 
domestic propaganda value, while less prominent than in preceding years, still remained, as can 
be seen in the emphasis of the CCP and Mao’s “wise decision” throughout the speech. 
iv) 1960 - Early 1966: Pivot to DPRK 
 Speeches from 1960 to 1966 demonstrated the CCP’s attempt to further solidify PRC-
DPRK relations, with the Korean War narrative focusing more on international signaling than 
domestic propaganda. However, domestic rallying remained a key factor in the narrative as the 
CCP emphasized the continuing need to struggle against the United States. 
 The 1960s witnessed growing PRC-USSR rivalry, as each strived to garner support from 
other countries in the Socialist bloc—including the DPRK—to establish itself as the leader of the 
Socialist bloc and the International Communist Movement.  Reflecting the CCP’s desire to win 56
 Ibid.55
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DPRK support, Chinese leadership brought the spotlight of the Korean War to the DPRK by  
dramatically shifting its main national commemoration date from October 25, when China 
entered the war, to June 25, when the war began. Actively adopting the DPRK’s war narrative by 
calling the war the “Great Fatherland Liberation War,” these June events were hosted annually 
except for the year 1962, while China’s entry into the Korean War was celebrated only on 1960 
and 1965. 
 Speeches during the June events indicated the CCP’s desire to give the DPRK more credit 
and portray the two countries’ bond as advancing the benefit of the Socialist bloc in terms of 
security and ideological development. In all events, CCP leaders argued that the U.S. imperialists 
started the invasive war against North Korea, touting the “heroic North Korean people” and their 
victorious struggle against the invaders and expressing continued Chinese support of the DPRK’s 
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struggle against U.S. threat.  Except for the 1960 June, 1960 October, and 1965 October 57
celebrations, which characterized the victory of the war as jointly earned, all subsequent 
speeches characterized the war as a unilateral victory of the DPRK, with Chinese participation 
only briefly mentioned.  Not only getting credit for winning the war, the DPRK also got credit 58
 See, for instance, “Jinian Chaoxian renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de zuguo jiefang zhanzheng shizhounian Shoudu wanren 57
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支持朝鲜人民要求美国侵略军撤出南朝鲜和统一祖国斗争大会上 茅盾副主席的讲话 [Vice Chairman Mao Dun’s speech at 
the convention of people of all walks of life of the capital supporting North Korean people’s demand of the U.S. invaders to 
withdraw troops from South Korea and struggle for unification of motherland], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), 
June 26, 1964, accessed April 5, 2020; “Zai shoudu gejie renmin jinian ‘liu · erwu’ shiwu zhounian zhichi Chaoxian renmin fan 
Mei douzheng yue dahui shang Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang de jianghua” 在首都各界人民纪念“六·二五”十五周年支持朝鲜人
民反美斗争月大会上刘宁一副委员长的讲话 [Vice Committee Chair Liu Ningyi’s speech at the convention of people of all 
walks of life of the capital commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of ‘6.25’ and month of supporting North Korean people’s 
anti-U.S. struggle], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1965, accessed April 5, 2020; and “Shoudu jihui 
jinian Chaoxian jiefang zhanzheng shiliu zhounian Chen Yi fuzongli he Lin Feng, Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang deng lingdaoren 
chuxi le dahui” 首都集会纪念朝鲜解放战争十六周年陈毅副总理和林枫、刘宁一副委员长等领导人出席了大会 [Capital 
rally commemorate sixteenth anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War; Leaders such as Vice Premier Chen 
Yi, Vice Chairmen Lin Feng and Liu Ningyi attend conference], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1966, 
accessed February 22, 2020.
 See, for instance, “Jinian Chaoxian renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de zuguo jiefang zhanzheng shizhounian Shoudu wanren 58
jihui zhichi Chaoxian fandui Meiguo qinlüe” 纪念朝鲜⼈民反对美国侵略的祖国解放战争⼗周年 首都万人集会支持朝鲜反
对美国侵略 [Commemorating the tenth anniversary of the North Korean people’s Great Fatherland Liberation War resisting U.S. 
invasion Rally of the ten thousand people of the capital support North Korea’s opposition of U.S. invasion], People’s Daily — 
Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1960, accessed February 22, 2020. For the October celebrations, please refer to “Zhong 
Chao renmin dabai le gongtong diren——Meidiguozhuyi  Pumie le qinlüe zhanhuo, zhengjiu le yazhou he shijie heping” 中朝人
民打败了共同敌人——美帝国主义  扑灭了侵略战⽕，拯救了亚洲和世界和平 [The people of China and North Korea 
defeated common enemy—U.S. imperialism, extinguished the flames of war of the invasion, saved Asia and world peace] 
People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1960, accessed August 16, 2019; “Shoudu longzhong jihui jinian 
zhiyuanjun fu Chao zuozhan shiwu zhounian” 首都隆重集会纪念志愿军赴朝作战十五周年 [Capital host grand rally 
commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the People’s Volunteer Army’s going to Korea and fighting],  People’s Daily — 
Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1965, accessed October 12, 2019.
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for protecting China’s safety; as Guo Moruo stated in 1960, “through their heroic fight, the North 
Korean people not only defended their sacred territory, but also defended the entire Socialist 
bloc, and directly used their flesh and blood to support [China].”  These speeches interpreted the 59
Korean War as mainly undertaken by the DPRK, with the Chinese people having unilaterally 
benefitted from the DPRK’s fight and accordingly owing gratitude and recognition to the DPRK. 
 Meanwhile, the lack of recognition and later criticism of the USSR reflected the ongoing 
Sino-Soviet split and the CCP’s denouncement of the USSR as revisionist.  Only the 1960 60
speeches mentioned the USSR as the leader of the Socialist bloc; subsequent speeches did not 
mention the USSR at all, and the 1966 speech by Foreign Minister Chen Yi directly criticized the 
USSR as “revisionists.”  Hailing what Chen characterized in his 1962 speech as the “proletarian 61
internationalist friendship between the people of China and North Korea that was sealed with 
blood,” the CCP attempted to portray China (and DPRK) as more ideologically proper than the 
USSR, implying its legitimacy as the international leader of the Socialist bloc. 
 Despite these international messages, the speeches maintained their domestic 
propagandistic value. All speeches consistently emphasized the U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan and 
invasion of Chinese territorial sovereignty, and speeches in 1960 and 1962 also argued that U.S. 
imperialists’ “invasive” or “bandit-like” nature “cannot be changed,” calling for fighting against 
 “Jinian Chaoxian renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de zuguo jiefang zhanzheng shizhounian Shoudu wanren jihui zhichi Chaoxian 59
fandui Meiguo qinlüe” 纪念朝鲜⼈民反对美国侵略的祖国解放战争⼗周年 首都万人集会支持朝鲜反对美国侵略 
[Commemorating the tenth anniversary of the North Korean people’s Great Fatherland Liberation War resisting U.S. invasion 
Rally of the ten thousand people of the capital support North Korea’s opposition of U.S. invasion], People’s Daily — Renmin 
Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1960, accessed February 22, 2020.
 See, for instance, “Excerpts From Chinese Communists’ Attack on Policies of Soviet Party Leadership,” New York Times, 60
February 7, 1964, accessed March 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/07/archives/excerpts-from-chinese-communists-
attack-on-policies-of-soviet-party.html.
 “Shoudu jihui jinian Chaoxian jiefang zhanzheng shiliu zhounian Chen Yi fuzongli he Lin Feng, Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang 61
deng lingdaoren chuxi le dahui” 首都集会纪念朝鲜解放战争十六周年陈毅副总理和林枫、刘宁一副委员长等领导人出席
了大会 [Capital rally commemorate sixteenth anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War; Leaders such as 
Vice Premier Chen Yi, Vice Chairmen Lin Feng and Liu Ningyi attend conference], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-
Present), June 26, 1966, accessed February 22, 2020.
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the United States to continue instead of attempting to negotiate.  This sentiment culminated in 62
1966 when Chen called for the nation to push for the Cultural Revolution and unite under Mao 
Zedong Thought to “carry through to the end the struggle to resist imperialism, resist 
revisionism, [and] resist reactionaries in each country.”  Even when the Korean War narrative 63
pivoted toward international signaling, the CCP kept using the Korean War for domestic 
objectives nonetheless. 
v) Later 1966 - 1969: Cultural Revolution 
 Between the latter half of 1966 and 1969, no reports of CCP-hosted commemoration 
events of the Korean War were found. The only exception was a brief 1968 People’s Daily article 
that reported on the local sacrifice offering ceremony held at the Martyrs Cemetery of the 
 “Jinian Chaoxian renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de zuguo jiefang zhanzheng shizhounian Shoudu wanren jihui zhichi Chaoxian 62
fandui Meiguo qinlüe” 纪念朝鲜⼈民反对美国侵略的祖国解放战争⼗周年 首都万人集会支持朝鲜反对美国侵略 
[Commemorating the tenth anniversary of the North Korean people’s Great Fatherland Liberation War resisting U.S. invasion 
Rally of the ten thousand people of the capital support North Korea’s opposition of U.S. invasion], People’s Daily — Renmin 
Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1960, accessed February 22, 2020;  “Shoudu shenghui jinian Chaoxian zuguo jiefang zhanzheng 
shier zhounian” 首都盛会纪念朝鲜祖国解放战争十二周年 [Capital event commemorate twelfth anniversary of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1962, 
accessed February 22, 2020; “Zai shou du gejie renmin fandui Meijun jixu qinzhan Nanchaoxian dahui shang Liao Chengzhi 
tongzhi de jianghua” 在首都各界人民反对美军继续侵占南朝鲜大会上 廖承志通知的讲话 [Comrade Liao Chengzhi’s 
speech at the convention of people from all walks of life from the capital resisting the U.S. military’s continued invasion and 
occupation of South Korea], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1963, accessed February 22, 2020; 
“Zaishoudu gejie renmin zhichi Chaoxian renmin yaoqiu Meiguo qinlüejun chechu Nanchaoxian he tongyi zuguo douzheng 
dahui shang Mao Dun fuzhuxi de jianghua” 在首都各界人民支持朝鲜人民要求美国侵略军撤出南朝鲜和统一祖国斗争大会
上 茅盾副主席的讲话 [Vice Chairman Mao Dun’s speech at the convention of people of all walks of life of the capital 
supporting North Korean people’s demand of the U.S. invaders to withdraw troops from South Korea and struggle for unification 
of motherland], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1964, accessed April 5, 2020; “Zai shoudu gejie 
renmin jinian ‘liu · erwu’ shiwu zhounian zhichi Chaoxian renmin fan Mei douzheng yue dahui shang Liu Ningyi 
fuweiyuanzhang de jianghua” 在首都各界人民纪念“六·二五”十五周年支持朝鲜人民反美斗争月大会上刘宁一副委员长的
讲话 [Vice Committee Chair Liu Ningyi’s speech at the convention of people of all walks of life of the capital commemorating 
the fifteenth anniversary of ‘6.25’ and month of supporting North Korean people’s anti-U.S. struggle], People’s Daily — Renmin 
Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1965, accessed April 5, 2020; “Shoudu jihui jinian Chaoxian jiefang zhanzheng shiliu zhounian 
Chen Yi fuzongli he Lin Feng, Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang deng lingdaoren chuxi le dahui” 首都集会纪念朝鲜解放战争十六
周年陈毅副总理和林枫、刘宁一副委员长等领导人出席了大会 [Capital rally commemorate sixteenth anniversary of North 
Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War; Leaders such as Vice Premier Chen Yi, Vice Chairmen Lin Feng and Liu Ningyi attend 
conference], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1966, accessed February 22, 2020.
 “Shoudu jihui jinian Chaoxian jiefang zhanzheng shiliu zhounian Chen Yi fuzongli he Lin Feng, Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang 63
deng lingdaoren chuxi le dahui” 首都集会纪念朝鲜解放战争十六周年陈毅副总理和林枫、刘宁一副委员长等领导人出席
了大会 [Capital rally commemorate sixteenth anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War; Leaders such as 
Vice Premier Chen Yi, Vice Chairmen Lin Feng and Liu Ningyi attend conference], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-
Present), June 26, 1966, accessed February 22, 2020.
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Chinese People's Volunteers at Shenyang and Dandong.  Even here, however, the report made 64
no political commentary except for a brief paragraph hailing the martyrs’ extraordinary 
“revolutionary spirit” and calling for the Chinese people to “carry through to the end the 
proletariat Cultural Revolution and . . . the revolutionary struggle against imperialism, 
revisionism, and reactionaries.”  65
 The fact that the Korean War was not used more often for domestic propaganda has a 
number of potential explanations. Some believe that this was due to the denouncement of Peng 
Dehuai, Leading Marshal of the PVA during the Korean War; invoking a war effort led by a 
denounced marshal may have been too risky during the Cultural Revolution.  Another 66
explanation is that PRC-DPRK relations during the Cultural Revolution were lukewarm at best. 
Shen and Xia argue that bilateral relations during this period deteriorated due to China’s “radical 
and uncompromising foreign and domestic policies.”  Ma Jisen, in her study of the Chinese 67
Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution, also mentions that the Chinese fervor to 
disseminate Mao Zedong Thought through overseas missions estranged North Korea, and efforts 
to improve bilateral ties came only in 1970 when Chinese ambassadors, recalled during the 
Cultural Revolution, were sent back to DPRK.  Considering that the Korean War was invoked 68
just before the Cultural Revolution as a key connection between the two countries, the 
 “Jinian Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kang Mei yuan Chao chuguo zuozhan shiba zhounian  Shenyang Dandong deng geming 64
qunzhong jisao zhiyuanjun lieshimu” 纪念中国⼈民志愿军抗美援朝出国作战⼗⼋周年  沈阳丹东等地革命群众祭扫志愿军
烈士墓 [Shenyang, Dandong and other regions’ revolutionary masses hold sacrifice sweeps at the Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid 
Korea Martyrs' Cemetery to celebrate the eighteenth anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s going abroad to 
fight], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1968, accessed August 16, 2019.
 Ibid.65
 Jung Keun-Sik, for instance, argues that the experience of the Korean War “did not sufficiently function as a device of political 66
propaganda due to the downfall of Peng Dehuai, the chief commander of the war, during the Cultural Revolution.” Jung Keun-
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subsequent cooling of relations might have sufficed for the CCP to stop invoking the war. Either 
way, the Korean War, previously actively celebrated for propaganda purposes, suffered low 
commemoration during the late 1960s precisely due to its political value. That the war was not 
invoked during politically sensitive times all the more highlighted the war narrative’s usage as 
political propaganda. 
vi) 1970 - 1971: Reviving PRC-DPRK Ties 
 The CCP broke its long hiatus and held two Korean War commemoration events in 1970,  
the first celebrating the 20th anniversary of the “Great Fatherland Liberation War” on June 25, 
and the second commemorating the 20th anniversary of China’s entry into the war on October 
25.  An additional anniversary celebration of June 25 was held on 1971.  The adjusted narrative 69 70
again demonstrated the CCP’s use of the Korean War for international signaling, calling for 
closer ties with the DPRK amid rising tensions with the USSR. 
 CCP leadership speeches from all three events delivered the same narrative as the early 
1960s speeches. For instance, the 1970 June speech, delivered by State Council Deputy Prime 
 “Zai shoudu renmin jinian Chaoxian zuguo jiefang zhanzheng ershi zhounian he shengtao Mei diguo zhuyi bazhan woguo 69
Taiwan dahui shang Li Xiannian tongzhi de jianghua” 在首都人民纪念朝鲜祖国解放战争二十周年和声讨美帝国主义霸占我
国台湾大会上 李先念同志的讲话 [Comrade Li Xiannan’s speech at the capital’s people’s convention for the twentieth 
anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War and condemning the U.S. imperialists’ forcible occupation of our 
country’s Taiwan], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1970, accessed April 5, 2020; “Shoudu wanren 
shenghui jinian Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun fu Chao canzhan ershi zhounian” 首都万人盛会纪念中国人民志愿军赴朝参战
二十周年 [Capital event commemorate twentieth anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s going to North Korea 
and entering the war], PLA Daily, October 25, 1970, accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14028671; 
“Huang Yongsheng zong canmouzhang de jianghua” 黄永胜总参谋长的讲话 [Speech by Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng], PLA 
Daily, October 25, 1970, accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14028675.
 “Shoudu renmin zhuangyan jihui jinian Chaoxian zuguo jiefang zhanzheng ershiyi zhounian fennu shengtao Mei di qinlüe 70
Chaoxian, bazhan woguo lingtu Taiwan de taotian zuixing” 首都人民庄严集会纪念朝鲜祖国解放战争二十一周年 愤怒声讨
美帝侵略朝鲜、霸占我国领⼟台湾的滔天罪⾏ [People of the capital solemnly assemble and commemorate twenty-first 
anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War and furiously denounce the heinous crime of the U.S. imperialists 
invading North Korea and forcefully occupying our territory Taiwan], PLA Daily, June 26, 1971, accessed October 12, 2019, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14036717; “Guo Moruo tongzhi de jianghua” 郭沫若同志的讲话 [Comrade Guo Moruo’s 
speech], PLA Daily, June 26, 1971, accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14036728.
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Minister Li Xiannian, stated that the U.S. imperialists started the war against the DPRK as a step 
to invade China.  Claiming the war as the DPRK’s victory, Li stated that North Korea 71
successfully thwarted the United States’ “outrageous scheme to take over Asia and seek 
hegemony of the world.”  Li also characterized PRC-DPRK relations as a “solid militant 72
friendship forged by fresh blood,” continuing the early 1960s trend of praising the bilateral 
relationship.  Li called the United States the “most ferocious enemy of the people across the 73
world,” but stated that the people must not fear it and fight against “U.S. imperialists,” again 
mobilizing the domestic population by invoking a need to fight against a threatening enemy.  74
 Li’s Korean War narrative did, however, have a notable development—Japan was 
included in the list of enemies. In his criticism against the United States, Li stated that it “already 
revived Japanese militarism,” that “the Japanese reactionaries [were] trying to go down the same 
road of Tojo Hideki,” and that “the U.S. imperialists [were] using Japanese reactionaries as the 
daring vanguard of its invasion into Asia.”  Lumping the United States and Japan together as the 75
PRC and DPRK’s enemy, Li announced that “if the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries dare 
impose[d] another invasive war upon the people of China and North Korea, the Chinese 
people . . . will unite with the North Korean people as before, fight shoulder to shoulder, and 
thoroughly defeat the invaders.”  76
 Villainizing Japan reflected the newfound foreign policy needs of the CCP. The post-
 “Zai shoudu renmin jinian Chaoxian zuguo jiefang zhanzheng ershi zhounian he shengtao Mei diguo zhuyi bazhan woguo 71
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Cultural Revolution return of PRC diplomats to DPRK and mutual hostility toward Japan in 
1970 allowed for improved PRC-DPRK relations.  The March 1969 PRC-USSR border conflict 77
over the Zhenbao/Damansky Island and concerns over the possibility of a major military 
confrontation with the USSR also prompted the CCP to lure the DPRK away from Moscow and 
closer to Beijing.  These factors created a favorable environment for PRC-DPRK 78
rapprochement; as Shen and Xia contend, “China . . . mended fences with North Korea before 
the process of rapprochement with the United States entered into full swing.”  The speeches’ 79
addition of Japan in the list of enemies could have easily been a reflection of joint wariness of 
Japan’s rise in Asia as well as the rekindled camaraderie between the PRC and DPRK. 
vii) 1972 - 1978: U.S.-PRC Rapprochement 
 This PRC-DPRK camaraderie, however, was damaged as the CCP sought another avenue 
of balancing USSR threats—the United States. With the famous “Ping-Pong diplomacy” in April 
1971, PRC-U.S. relations improved rapidly, with U.S. National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger’s visit in July 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972, and normalization of 
relations in 1979.  80
 As if reflecting these developments, there were no reports of CCP-hosted Korean War 
commemoration events during these years. The only report was a People’s Daily article on a 
regional tomb-sweeping occasion in Liaoning Province to commemorate the 25th anniversary of 
China’s entry to the Korean War, but the article merely covered facts about the event (i.e. tomb-
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sweeping and wreath presentations) with no political interpretation of the event attached.  81
 Amid ongoing engagement with the United States, invoking “U.S. imperialism” and its 
“invasive schemes” may have simply not been palatable. The DPRK’s unilateral actions that 
escalated tensions in the Korean Peninsula since 1974 may have furthered the CCP’s desire to 
distance itself from the DPRK.  Shen and Xia argue that “China’s primary foreign policy goal 82
[from 1970 to 1976] was to maintain détente with Washington . . . to form a united front to 
counter the Soviet threat and to prevent a resumption of war on the Korean Peninsula.”  If so, 83
messages that the Chinese people would “unite with the North Korean people” to “struggle 
against a common enemy” and “support North Korea’s efforts for unification,” per earlier 
speeches, may have been the last signal that the CCP wanted to give to the DPRK. 
viii) 1979 - 1989: Pivot to Domestic and Academic Significance 
 Three years after Mao’s death, a year after Hua Guofeng’s replacement by Deng 
Xiaoping as Mao’s successor, and the year when U.S.-PRC relations were normalized, 1979 
marked a watershed moment in Chinese history on all accounts. The following years witnessed a 
significant reeling back of politically-charged rhetoric, and topics considered taboo during the 
Cultural Revolution were more openly discussed. While this allowed for the proliferation of 
academic studies on veterans’ experiences during the Korean War, the CCP refrained from 
hosting central commemoration events. A potential explanation is the souring PRC-DPRK 
relations amid Deng’s rapprochement with capitalist countries and his resolve to prevent 
 “Liaoning sheng geweihui Shenyang budui Shenyang shi geweihui deng jisao kang Mei yuan Chao lieshimu” 辽宁省⾰委会81
沈阳部队沈阳市⾰委会等 祭扫抗美援朝烈士墓 [Liaoning Province Revolutionary Committee Shenyang Division, Shenyang 
Municipal Revolutionary Committee and others sweep Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Martyrs' Cemetery], People’s 
Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1975, accessed August 16, 2019.
 Shen and Xia, A Misunderstood Friendship, 229.82
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entanglement in another Korean war. 
 Since 1979, posthumously reinstated Peng Dehuai was oft invoked in news articles. A 
1979 PLA Daily article by Deng Hua, Li Zhimin, and Hong Xuezhi, all high-ranking PLA 
soldiers and Korean War veterans, reminisced how they “deeply miss[ed] the respected and loved 
commander Comrade Peng Dehuai,” reflecting on his brilliance as a military strategist and 
politician, and his admirable qualities that rendered him as “a model that we should learn from 
forever.”  Similar articles throughout this period hailed Peng as a hero that everyone must learn 84
from.  The posthumous exoneration of Peng allowed a part of the Korean War’s historical 85
memory to be at least tolerated, if not incorporated, by CCP leaders. 
 Additionally, starting from the 1985 publication of The Political Work of the Chinese 
People’s Volunteer Army during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, China saw a 
significant increase in academic research with approvals or publications by government-affiliated 
organizations.  That the aforementioned book was “written over 20 years ago but was shelved 86
due to historical reasons,” according to a People’s Daily article, all the more emphasized how the 
politically relaxed environment contributed to the increase in Korean War research in China.  87
 Nevertheless, this political environment did not contribute to the proliferation of general 
 Deng Hua 邓华, Li Zhimin 李志民, and Hong Xuezhi 洪学智, “Yingxiong qipo chui qiangu guoji jingshen zhao wanmin” 英84
雄⽓魄垂千古 国际精神召万民 [Everlasting heroic spirit, international spirit that gathers the nation], PLA Daily, October 25, 
1979, accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14154023.
 Some examples include Han Xianchu 韩先楚, and Jie Fang 解方, “Kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng zhong de Peng zong” 抗85
美援朝战争中的彭总 [Marshal Peng during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao 
(1946-Present), November 3, 1980, accessed August 16, 2019; and Wang Chengguang 王承光, “Mao Zedong junshi sixiang de 
zhongyao zucheng bufen” 毛泽东军事思想的重要组成部分 [Important component of Mao Zedong’s military thought], PLA 
Daily, October 25, 1988, accessed January 16, 2020, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14324847.
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Korean War commemoration events. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there was not a 
single CCP-hosted central commemoration event during these years, with only a handful of 
reports on DPRK-led events; even the 30th anniversary was overlooked in 1980. There are only 
intermittent reports of regional tomb-sweeping or wreath presentation events at the Martyrs 
Cemetery, but none of these reports included political commentary or speeches.  88
 This reluctance to celebrate the Korean War may be due to the growing divergence 
between the PRC and DPRK under Deng’s economic reform policies, combined with Deng’s 
reluctance to take a conciliatory attitude to North Korea during most of his tenure. Shen and Xia 
state that “China’s post-1978 policy of ‘reform and opening’ to the outside world shattered the 
economic foundation of the Sino-North Korean ‘special relationship,’” and warming relations 
between Beijing and Seoul further worried the DPRK leadership.  In 1985, Deng even stated 89
that “[China] should not give the North Koreans the wrong impression that whatever they ask for 
[China] will give them,” and, after Vietnam and Albania’s falling out with Beijing, “[China] 
should be prepared for the third one [North Korea] to fall out with [China].”  Deng’s reluctance 90
to maintain a conciliatory approach to the DPRK, as well as his prioritization of rapprochement 
 See, for instance, “Liaoning sheng Shenyang shi gejie he zhujun jisao kang Mei yuan Chao lieshimu” 辽宁省沈阳市各界和驻88
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Aid Korea Martyrs' Cemetery], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1980, accessed August 16, 2019; 
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canzhan 31 zhounian” 辽宁各界代表向抗美援朝烈⼠墓敬献花圈 纪念中国⼈民志愿军赴朝参战31周年 [Liaoning province 
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(1946-Present), April 5, 1984, accessed August 16, 2019; “Liaoning gejie daibiao qingming jisao kang Mei yuan Chao lieshi 
lingyuan” 辽宁各界代表清明祭扫抗美援朝烈⼠陵园 [Liaoning Province representatives of various circles sweep the Resist 
U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Martyr’s Cemetery during Qingming], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), April 6, 
1985, accessed August 16, 2019; and “Liaoning sheng he Shenyang shi qunzhong qianwang kang Mei yuan Chao lieshi lingyuan 
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with capitalist countries, all the more alienated the DPRK. 
 Considering how Korean War commemoration speeches were used as an international 
signaling tool, the CCP’s silence could be interpreted as the party’s message to the DPRK that 
the “special relationship” was no longer, or at least that the PRC was trying to distance itself 
from the DPRK. Perhaps the CCP itself was unsure of its objectives with DPRK at the time, or at 
least did not want to publicize them. Indeed, scholars have faced significant difficulties 
identifying Deng’s foreign policy goals toward the DPRK during the 1980s, as reflected in the 
dearth of scholarly research on the topic. While it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on 
Deng’s intentions, one thing is clear—PRC-DPRK relations were increasingly waning. 
ix) 1989 - 1990: Tiananmen Square 
 With improved PRC-DPRK ties in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, the 
years 1989 and 1990 marked the return of Korean War commemoration; the rhetoric itself, 
however, suggested that the CCP’s bigger objective was domestic consolidation rather than 
international signaling or affirmation of PRC-DPRK ties. 
 Existing scholarship suggests that Deng’s approach to the DPRK changed in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, which brought forth international backlash and 
criticism of the CCP’s violation of human rights. Shen and Xia claim that “[i]n the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square incident and the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, in 
1989 . . . Beijing and Pyongyang became fellow sufferers who could commiserate with each 
other.”  Song’s research into Deng’s perspective on the Korean War similarly notes how Deng, 91
after the Tiananmen Square incident, argued that Western countries and the United States had no 
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right to criticize China of “human rights violations” considering the high casualties they inflicted 
on China during the war.  92
 Reflecting these improved bilateral ties was the revival of Korean War commemoration 
events after a more-than-a-decade long hiatus, with the CCP’s October celebration of the 40th 
anniversary of its entry to the Korean War.  During the event, Zhou Wenyuan, Vice-Chair of the 93
PLA’s General Political Department, stated that the “great victory” of the Korean War protected 
China’s safety and world peace, allowed for China’s national reconstruction, raised the Chinese 
people’s political consciousness and national pride, stimulated the country’s revolutionary 
energy, and promoted China’s national defense and modernization.  He then noted that the 94
“profound friendship” with the North Korean people was formed during the war and survived the 
test of time during the post-war decades.  This invocation of PRC-DPRK ties suggested that the 95
CCP indeed warmed up to the DPRK after the Tiananmen Square incident, again emphasizing 
the international signaling value of the Korean War. 
 This acknowledgement of ties, however, was the farthest the CCP would go in 
highlighting its relations with North Korea; the rest of the speech suggested that since 1990 the 
CCP pivoted toward emphasizing the Korean War’s domestic historical significance than its 
international legacies. The vast majority of the People’s Daily article covering the 1980 event 
 Song Jin, “Deng Xiaoping guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao de ruogan shidian tanxi” 邓⼩平关于抗美援朝的若⼲视点探析 92
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October 25, 1990, accessed February 22, 2020.
 Ibid.94
 Ibid.95
  Han 39
focused on the speeches by various “comrades” including former PVA Commander Yang Dezhi, 
which barely mentioned the DPRK and discussed mainly the domestic takeaways of the war. 
Specifically, these speeches argued that the greatest legacy of the war was the “spirit” it 
embodied, such as the unity of people under patriotism, revolutionary heroism, and the CCP’s 
correct leadership that led to ultimate victory.  The speeches concluded that this “spirit” must be 96
applied in the modern context to promote the nation’s and the military’s Socialist 
modernization.  This new emphasis of the “spirit” of the Korean War diverted attention away 97
from the notion of “struggle” against an adversary or wartime specificities, including who the 
enemy was or who fought with the Chinese—indeed, not even once was the United States or 
“imperialism” mentioned besides in the slogan “Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.” The 
speeches instead emphasized the Chinese people’s conduct and accomplishments during the war
—what the speeches called the war’s “spirit.” This domestic shift in attention in turn allowed for 
domestic rallying of the people toward ongoing CCP projects—in this case “modernization”—
under the “correct leadership” of the CCP. 
 The developments in the Korean War narrative from 1989 to 1990 demonstrated the 
CCP’s prioritization of the Korean War’s domestic propaganda value over international 
signaling, amid uncertainties in China’s relationship with the DPRK and growing ties with the 
United States. The revival of only the October commemorations—and not the June events—
further demonstrated this domestic emphasis. In particular, the newly coined concept of a 
uniquely Chinese “spirit” that called for the Chinese nation to work toward the country’s 
Socialist modernization paralleled Deng’s 1986 initiative of “Socialist Spiritual Civilization,” 
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which aimed at strengthening the CCP’s political-ideological control over the country and 
continuing the country’s socialist development.  Thus, while the revival of Korean War 98
commemoration may have been influenced by warming PRC-DPRK ties, these international 
objectives were overshadowed by the war narrative’s domestic propaganda messages. 
x) 1993: PRC-ROK Rapprochement 
 Starting from the 1990s, there were very few commemoration events except ten-year 
anniversary speeches. Regardless, the 1990s witnessed one unique commemoration event of the 
war: the opening ceremony of the Memorial of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea 
in 1993.  Hu Jintao’s speech at the event demonstrated the CCP’s continuing emphasis on the 99
domestic takeaways of the Korean War; his lack of emphasis on PRC-DPRK ties, on the other 
hand, reflected China’s improving relations with the United States and South Korea, and these 
new partners’ subsequent challenges to China’s previously DPRK-centric war narrative. 
 Hu’s Korean War narrative, at first glance, was emphatically domestically oriented. First, 
Hu’s speech barely mentions the DPRK. Claiming that China entered the war when “the DPRK 
was at a critical juncture and [China’s] safety was seriously threatened,” Hu praised the “wise 
decision” of the CCP and Mao to enter the war.  Hu then stated that the Chinese PVA, under the 100
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leadership of Peng Dehuai, created a heroic feat that shocked the world.  Touting the Korean 101
War “spirit” as did the 1990 speech, Hu called for the Chinese people to inherit the patriotism 
and revolutionary heroism of the Korean War and contribute to China’s reconstruction, Socialist 
modernization, and unification.  Nowhere did the article mention China’s “combat friendship” 102
with DPRK as did earlier speeches. By emphasizing China’s national security and mentioning 
only the PVA’s “feats,” Hu delivered a domestically centered narrative that barely acknowledged 
the DPRK. 
 Hu’s speech also significantly toned down accusations against the United States. Hu 
stated that the world was moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world, and argued that China 
needed a stable long-term environment in both domestic and international realms to continue its 
progress toward modernization. Hu also emphasized that China never was and never will claim 
to dominate the world and threaten any country.  Not once mentioning “U.S. imperialists” or 103
any enemy for that matter, Hu significantly deviated from earlier, more aggressive speeches that 
rallied the country for a continued struggle against a clearly labeled adversary. 
 This shift in the Korean War narrative suggested the CCP’s attempt to adjust the war 
narrative’s international signal to accommodate its new partners—the United States and South 
Korea—without alienating the DPRK. After normalization of PRC-ROK relations in 1992, China 
received requests from South Korea to amend its textbooks to a less pro-DPRK narrative, and 
affirmed to the ROK government its willingness to discuss the matter with relevant textbook 
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specific enemies, and characterization of the war as a “victory” (the slogans did imply a victory, 
but coverage of Hu’s speech never mentioned the word), all could have been efforts to balance 
the conflicting demands of China’s new international partners. The fact that South Korean news 
coverage interpreted the event as a reaffirmation of Chinese ties to North Korea suggested that 
while China’s new narrative was clearly less emphatic of its PRC-DPRK ties, it was not wholly 
conforming to ROK standards either.  This intentional ambivalence may all the more suggest 105
the conflicting demands the CCP faced and the party’s attempt to placate all counterparts 
involved. 
 Meanwhile, the narrative’s domestic orientation may have been in coordination with the 
CCP’s Patriotic Education Campaign. Launched in 1991, the campaign aimed at educating 
China’s new generation of the country’s “humiliating” past, the role of the “West” in China’s 
suffering, and the CCP’s role in reviving the country’s glory.  As the CCP’s response to the 106
Tiananmen Square incident, this campaign “used historical education as an instrument for the 
glorification of the party, for the consolidation of the PRC’s national identity, and for the 
justification of . . . the CCP’s one party rule.”  The new Korean War narrative fit squarely into 107
this mold: the “West”—the United States—threatened China’s national security, but China was 
able to persevere under the “wise” leadership of the CCP, and the new generation must learn 
from this historical past and continue to mobilize under the CCP’s guidance. Here again, the 
Korean War narrative thus served a dual purpose: domestically, to rally the public and bolster the 
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CCP’s legitimacy after the Tiananmen Square incident, and internationally, to balance the 
historical claims of both new and existing diplomatic partners. 
xi) 2000: Jiang Zemin’s Speech 
 In 2000, the CCP hosted a 50th anniversary event for the PVA’s entry to the Korean 
War.  In his speech, Jiang Zemin, then President of the PRC, highlighted the Korean War 108
“spirit,” discouraged military buildup, and touted ethnic diversity as the key to peace, reflecting 
growing domestic ethnic challenges and need for stability to promote economic development. 
Meanwhile, by being the first to call the war a “civil war” at an official CCP commemoration 
event, Jiang further distanced China from the DPRK and incorporated other international 
partners into the Korean War narrative. 
 Like Hu, Jiang invoked the concept of the “spirit of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding 
Korea,” praising the accomplishments of the PVA during the war. Jiang argued that the victory 
was the result of the “wise leadership of the CCP and Mao Zedong” that helped realize the PVA’s 
“political advantage” and “glorious tradition of [the Chinese] military,” and paid respect to the 
“older generation of proletarian revolutionists and Chinese PVA” and “the martyrs.” Jiang then 
called for the Chinese people to learn from this “spirit” and moral character and “carry forward 
patriotism and revolutionary heroism,” putting this spirit toward the “CCP’s and the country’s 
various projects,” including Socialist modernization, unification, and peaceful development of 
the world.  109
 Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Zai shoudu gejie jinian Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kang Mei yuan Chao chuguo zuozhan wushi 108
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 Meanwhile, portraying China as the upholder of international diversity and peace, Jiang 
stated that “history ha[d] already proven that . . . strengthening military alliances and military 
preparation cannot foster long-term peace,” and that peace was only possible through “respecting 
the sovereign decisions of each country’s people and global diversity.”  Arguing that no country 110
has the right to claim hegemony or invade other countries’ sovereignties, Jiang characterized 
China as “an everlasting firm force of upholding world peace and promoting world progress.”  111
Jiang concluded his speech by calling for “all of the CCP and people of all ethnic groups” to 
unite under Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the CCP’s 
basic line.  112
 Jiang also further distanced China from the DPRK and accommodated its new 
international partners, with two notable changes. Jiang’s speech was the first official CCP 
Korean War speech since the 1960s that gave credit to the Soviet Union for assisting China 
during the war, signaling improved China-Russia relations.  More importantly, however, 113
Jiang’s was the first of all Korean War commemoration speeches to call the war the “Korean 
Civil War” and to state that China entered the war “upon the request of the Worker’s Party of 
Korea and the North Korean government.”  This characterization exonerated China from the 114
liability of the Korean War by suggesting that the war was a strictly Korean issue. 
Simultaneously, it elided the United States as the starter of the war, although Jiang nevertheless 
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newly established People’s Republic of China.”  115
 Jiang’s speech marked a significant evolution of the Korean War narrative’s international 
message, accommodating South Korean and U.S. narratives of the war while avoiding alienation 
of the DPRK. With the growth of available Soviet archival material, it became increasingly 
difficult to deny that North Korea started the war, and South Korea had been requesting the CCP 
to correct its historical narrative to accommodate this fact. Not explicitly stating that North 
Korea started the war may have been the CCP’s attempt to not fully reject the North Korean 
narrative that the war was its struggle for “liberation” against “imperialist invasion”; the 
deliberate use of ambiguity seen in 1993 is applied again. 
 Nevertheless, the CCP used this edited narrative to signal its discontent toward the United 
States. The 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade led to heightened Chinese 
anti-U.S. sentiments, with Vice President Hu notably condemning “the barbaric act of NATO, led 
by the United States” and translating the bombing as an “invasion” as well as a breach of 
“sovereignty” and “justice.”  If Hu’s response to the bombing could be seen as an adoption of 116
Korean War “talking points,” Jiang’s speech further bolstered this traditional criticism against the 
United States by framing it as guilty of “meddling in other countries affairs.” 
 Jiang’s presentation of the party as the upholder of diversity, on the other hand, may have 
been both a domestic and international message to global criticism of the CCP for human rights 
violations, amid government crackdowns against rising ethnic unrest in Xinjiang during the 
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1990s.  His last call for unity of “people of all ethnic groups” sent a domestic message that the 117
CCP is infallible, particularly in its approach to Chinese minority ethnic groups, and an 
international one that it will not accept any foreign criticism on the matter. The Korean War 
narrative thus maintained its dual propagandistic value for the CCP even in the 21st century. 
xii) 2010: Xi Jinping’s Speech 
 The latest CCP-led Korean War commemoration event was the 60th anniversary forum 
on China’s entering the war in 2010.  While Xi Jinping, then Vice President of the PRC, 118
adopted most of Jiang’s narrative, he was more assertive in both domestic and international 
messages, further emphasizing ethnic unity and assuming a larger role in the Korean peninsula. 
 Reiterating that the Korean War was a “victory” in a “righteous war of upholding peace 
and resisting invasion,” Xi highlighted the PVA’s patriotism, revolutionary spirit, and 
internationalism.  Emphasizing that commemorating the Korean War was “not for extending 119
antagonism . . . but to learn from historical experiences to gain long-term lessons,” Xi called for 
the country to unite under the CCP and Hu Jintao’s leadership, and promote the party’s socialist 
policies and the “great revival of the Chinese people.”  Xi framed the United States as China’s 120
antagonist, guilty of forcing the war upon the Chinese people and of “armed interference” in 
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Korean affairs. By maintaining that the Korean War was a civil war and that China intervened 
only upon the request of the North Korean government, Xi exonerated the CCP from the 
potential criticism that it was also guilty of “armed interference.”  Line by line, Xi’s general 121
narrative paralleled that of Jiang in its domestic and international messages. 
 Xi’s speech was unique, however, in that it extensively described the Korean War’s 
“victory” as a result of China’s national ethnical unity. Xi stated that the PVA’s “victory . . . [wa]s 
inseparable from the vigorous support from people of all ethnicities across the country.”  Xi 122
then defined the Korean War “spirit” as “a powerful force of people of all ethnicities across the 
country bound by a bitter hatred of a common enemy and vanquishing the enemy to score 
victory.”  Calling for the nation to unite again under the “spirit” of the Korean War, Xi 123
emphasized the ongoing need for promoting ethnic unity under the CCP’s leadership. 
Significantly ramped up from Jiang’s rhetoric of ethnic diversity, Xi’s rallying was most likely a 
response to the ongoing ethnic conflicts within China, with memories of the deadly July 2009 
Urumqi riots still fresh.  The rising domestic need for ethnic control thus made its way into the 124
Korean War narrative through a new emphasis on ethnicity in the description of the 1950s war 
effort. 
 Additionally, unlike Jiang who distanced China from the Korean peninsula, Xi assigned a 
greater role to China in maintaining peace in the region to prevent spillover instability in Chinese 
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“necessary” for China’s realization of peaceful development, Xi further emphasized that China 
“devot[ed] itself to upholding the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.”  Indeed, the 125
2000s witnessed China’s greater involvement in the peninsula as reflected in China’s role in 
running Six Party Talks to discuss North Korea’s denuclearization from 2003. This rhetoric also 
echoed the CCP’s so-called “China’s Peaceful Rise” policy to use China’s economy and 
diplomacy to allow for the country’s economic growth while catalyzing global peace.  Xi’s 126
alteration of the Korean War narrative to fit domestic and international objectives of the CCP 
again underlined the versatility of the narrative as a propaganda tool. 
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IV. Significance and Conclusions 
 The above analysis of the CCP’s Korean War narrative spans 60 years of the party’s 
active use of commemoration events as a propaganda platform for communicating its domestic 
and international objectives to the public. What, then, do these 60 years tell us? 
 If the CCP’s sweeping changes to its Korean War narrative can be attributed to 
contemporary political needs, then the descriptions that remained constant over time reveal CCP 
objectives that are as applicable today as they were since their inception in 1950. The Korean 
War commemoration speeches showed four consistencies. First, the war has always been 
trumpeted as a victory, despite changes to who is considered responsible for it—China, North 
Korea, or both. This description is contrary to what we know today; records of private arguments 
between Chinese and Soviet leaders in the 1960s blaming each other for starting the war make it 
clear that the CCP did not consider the war as “glorious” as the speeches suggested.  The 127
speeches’ consistent portrayal of the decision to enter the war as a brilliant success and 
reluctance to admit the war’s shortcomings, then, demonstrate the CCP’s desire to present itself 
as an infallible leader of the Chinese people; this perpetual correctness, in turn, is the CCP’s 
source of political legitimacy. 
 In addition to political legitimacy, this consistency may reflect the party’s consideration 
of the Chinese military and veterans. Perhaps the government simply could not afford to admit 
its mistake and risk disgracing the cause for which thousands of Chinese soldiers had lost their 
lives. The military’s significant role in the Chinese political sphere may also increase the CCP’s 
reluctance to admit its mistake, since doing so may bring not only the party’s competence but 
 See, for instance, the discussion between Chinese Politburo member Peng Zhen and Soviet Communist Party Chairman Nikita 127
Khrushchev on June 22, 1960, during their meeting in Bucharest, Romania. Yang Kuisong, “Introduction,” in Mao, Stalin and the 
Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s (Milton Park, Abingdon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 2-3.
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also the military’s on the line. The fact that these speeches consistently paid homage to martyrs 
and that recent speeches even credited the “older generation of revolutionaries and the PVA” for 
the “victory” of the Korean War doubly suggests the CCP’s wariness of the military. 
 Yet another explanation is that the CCP is trying to alleviate domestic fear of the United 
States by portraying China as its legitimate—and victorious—challenger. Yu Yong Tae’s study on 
Chinese textbooks, for instance, argues that the Chinese government aimed at relieving Chinese 
students’ fear toward the United States and strengthening their nationalist sentiments by 
trumpeting the Korean War as a massive success.  The speeches’ continued labeling the United 128
States as China’s opponent further suggests the CCP’s self-perceived rivalry with the United 
States and consequential desire to eliminate domestic fear toward this national rival. 
 Indeed, a second continuity in these speeches is that the adversary of the war is always 
clear: the United States. While the level of blame attached to the United States fluctuated over 
time, the title bestowed to the war—“the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea”—left the 
CCP’s ultimate adversary obvious. Even speeches that criticized South Korea’s “invasion” of 
North Korea claimed that the United States “ordered” Rhee Syng-man, then South Korean 
president, to start the war, and all countries in the UN forces were labeled as U.S. “followers” or 
“puppets,” bringing the audience’s attention back to the United States. 
 A similar attitude of hostility is shown in other sites of CCP commemoration of the 
Korean War. Jung Keun-Sik’s research even reveals that when the Memorial of the War to Resist 
U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was opened in 1993, there was internal debate on whether “the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet's blockade of the Taiwan Strait . . . should be described as an ‘invasion’ or an 
 Yu Yong-Tae 유용태, “Jungguk yeoksagyogwaseoui hyeondaesa insikgwa gukgajuui: hyeondae hanguksareul jungsimeuro” 128
중국 역사교과서의 현대사 인식과 국가주의: 현대 한국사를 중심으로 [Modern History Awareness and Nationalism in 
Chinese History Textbooks: Focusing on Modern Korean History], The Korean History Education Review 84 (December 2002): 
213.
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‘entry’ into Chinese territorial waters.”  Despite Jiang Zemin’s concern that “the expression 129
could lead to diplomatic problems,” ultimately “the Chinese leadership went with ‘invasion,’ 
maintaining the conventional Chinese narrative that the Korean War resulted from an American 
invasion.”  130
 That the CCP deliberately chose to maintain this narrative of hostility even after 
normalization of U.S.-PRC relations suggests that the party saw political advantages in doing so 
that outweighed the risk of potential “diplomatic problems.” One possible explanation, as 
suggested above, is that the CCP genuinely sees the United States as its rival—if not an enemy—
to this day. Indeed, as Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote to “hide your strength and bide your time” 
implies, the CCP may be perceiving the United States as a rival to be fought against for more 
international leadership or even potentially in direct military terms. If true, then this notion will 
bear major significance in understanding the PRC’s future global role and its motives behind 
contemporary policies of international expansion, directly addressing the decades-long debate on 
the future of U.S.-China relations and the possibility of avoiding competition between the two 
countries.  131
 Third, the CCP never revealed that the DPRK started the Korean War; the blame was 
instead attached to the United States, South Korea under U.S. orders, or not mentioned 
altogether. This reluctance to blame North Korea can be seen as the CCP’s implicit support of the 
DPRK while balancing competing demands from the ROK for a revised historical narrative. By 
not refuting the DPRK’s claim that it did not begin the war and saving the DPRK from 
 Jung Keun-Sik, “China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U.S. 129
Aggression and Aid Korea,’” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, no. 14 (March 2015), 69.
 Ibid.130
 For instance, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, October 22, 2009, 131
accessed April 6, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/clash-of-the-titans/.
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international embarrassment, the CCP signaled that it was still attentive to the needs and 
demands of North Korea, one of China’s few remaining Communist allies. Against the backdrop 
of recent speculations on how far China will push North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal, this 
reluctance of the CCP to completely severe ties with North Korea, even as it distanced itself from 
the DPRK more than ever, bears all the more significance in shedding light on the often elusive 
PRC policies toward North Korea.  132
 Lastly, despite the speeches’ characterization of the PRC as a peace-cherishing state, they 
consistently justified China’s entry to the Korean War in terms of national security, suggesting 
the CCP’s willingness to use military power beyond its borders in the face of security threats. 
This implication highlights the CCP’s notion of maintaining buffer states around its borders, and 
equating an attack on any of these states as a direct attack on China. That the CCP has never 
altered this argument to protect a buffer state for the sake of national security imply that, should 
push come to shove, the party may be willing to opt for that path again, which would have 
significant implications to Asia’s regional security. 
 Beyond the fine print, however, the case of Korean War commemoration holds 
significance of its own. As the first international war that the PRC engaged in, it set the 
precedent for all later national mobilization speeches and propaganda against perceived 
international threats. Indeed, although DPRK-led events were not included in this study due to its 
scope, some CCP leaders’ speeches in such events demonstrated the party’s adoption of Korean 
 See, for instance, Zhu Feng, “China’s North Korean Liability: How Washington Can Get Beijing to Rein In Pyongyang,” 132
Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2017, accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-07-11/chinas-
north-korean-liability; and Evan Osnos, “Why China Won’t Pressure North Korea As Much As Trump Wants,” New Yorker, 
September 19, 2017, accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-china-isnt-ready-to-put-
pressure-on-north-korea.
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War “talking points” in other border conflicts. For instance, at the DPRK embassy’s 1962 Korean 
War commemoration event, State Council Deputy Prime Minister Luo Ruiqing accused India of 
lacking “sincerity” to resolve the China-India border issue peacefully, claiming that if India had 
such sincerity, it would not reject China’s suggestion of a peaceful resolution.  This rhetoric 133
paralleled that of Zhou Enlai’s 1953 declaration on Korean War armistice discussions, where he 
argued that if the UN forces had the “sincere desire to seek peace,” they would be able to accept 
China’s “reasonable” suggestions.  Hu Jintao’s aforementioned 1999 response to the NATO 134
bombing similarly suggested the adoption of Korean War propaganda for other military conflicts, 
with the familiar argument that China is a peace-cherishing nation striving to reach a peaceful 
resolution even when under siege of belligerent states.  Studying the CCP’s Korean War 135
narrative can thus greatly contribute to understanding how CCP propaganda for later conflicts 
developed and how the party communicates its foreign policy objectives to its domestic public. 
 More broadly, the Korean War exemplifies how states use historical narratives as a 
malleable political propaganda tool. Especially when there is insufficient or mixed information 
on the given state’s objectives—as was the case for China and North Korea—public 
commemoration of historical events that reflect major domestic and global politics may thus 
serve as a reliable source for understanding state intentions. This method can be especially useful 
for studying single-party, authoritarian governments; the connection between the narrative and 
 “Zhongguo renmin yongyuan zhichi Guba geming” 中国人民永远支持古巴革命 [The Chinese people will support the 133
Cuban Revolution forever], PLA Daily, October 26, 1962, accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/
13941540.
 Zhou Enlai 周恩来, “Guanyu Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan wenti de shengming” 关于朝鲜停战谈判问题的声明 [Statement on 134
the Korean Armistice Negotiations], in Jian guo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao 建国以来周恩来文稿 [The manuscripts of Zhou 
Enlai since the Founding of the Nation], 1st ed, vol. 8 (Beijing, China: Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 2008), p. 221.
 “Ziliao: 1999 nian 5 yue 9 ri Hu Jintao jiu wozhu Nan shiguan zao xiji fabiao jianghua” 资料: 1999年5月9日胡锦涛就我驻135
南使馆遭袭击发表讲话 [Source: May 9th 1999 Hu Jintao delivers speech on the attack on our embassy in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia], China News, May 25, 2003, accessed March 26, 2020, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/
2003-05-25/14421097103.shtml.
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the state’s political objectives would be clearer since there would be fewer competing 
perspectives, while the state’s stricter control of available information would all the more require 
measures to glean insights from public sources. 
 The year in which this research is conducted coincides with the 70th anniversary of the 
Korean War. From Xi’s initial cold shoulder to Kim Jong-un to his first visit to the DPRK in June 
20, 2019, from Trump’s rhetoric of “fire and fury” to the first U.S.-DPRK summit, and from 
tensions over the South China Sea to the recent signs of peace after the U.S.-PRC trade war, the 
years 2011 to 2020 have witnessed significant developments in China’s relations with its East 
Asian neighbors and the United States.  This year’s 70th anniversary commemoration of the 136
Korean War would be a promising opportunity to understand how the CCP interpreted this 
tumultuous period and how it plans to navigate another eventful decade to come. 
(12,345 words, excluding footnotes, bibliographic essay, and bibliography) 
 Eleanor Albert, “The China–North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated June 25, 2019, accessed 136
February 27, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship; Jane Perlez, “Xi Jinping Arrives in North 
Korea, With Many Eyes on Trump,” New York Times, June 20, 2019, accessed February 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/20/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-north-korea.html; David E. Sanger, “How Trump Went From ‘Fire and Fury’ to 
Dismissing North Korean Nuclear Advances,” New York Times, July 4, 2018, accessed February 27, 2020, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/us/politics/trump-north-korea-nuclear.html; “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” Council 
on Foreign Relations, updated February 26, 2020, accessed February 27, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-
tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea; Peter Eavis, Alan Rappeport, and Ana Swanson, “What’s in (and Not in) the 
U.S.-China Trade Deal,” New York Times, January 15, 2020, accessed February 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/
business/economy/china-trade-deal-text.html.
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Bibliographic Essay 
 Coming to the topic of this essay was a natural combination of three key academic 
interests that I pursued at Yale: international relations of Northeast Asia; historical narrative as 
both the result and influencer of these relations; and my native country, Korea. If I were to 
pinpoint a time, however, it would be the latter half of the year 2017, amid North Korea’s 
ramping up of nuclear missile tests and U.S. President Donald Trump’s warnings of U.S. 
response of “fire and fury.”  During the outpour of speculations about the future of the Korean 137
peninsula, one topic did not cease to appear: what would the PRC do? Indeed, a multitude—if 
not an overwhelming majority—of scholars and reporters assumed that U.S. success in curbing 
North Korean missile tests would depend on China’s cooperation; what they disagreed upon was 
whether China would get on board with the United States.  Existing articles on China’s 138
strategic and political goals toward North Korea focused primarily on the beginning of the two 
countries’ relations from the Korean War in 1950, then shifted directly to contemporary relations 
of the 2000s.  The lack of explanation in between seemed to assert that China’s policy toward 139
the DPRK has remained constant throughout those decades, a notion I found highly unlikely. 
Considering the tumultuous changes in China’s political priorities and diplomatic relations—
especially rapprochement with the United States and South Korea—I believed that PRC-DPRK 
relations would have undergone significant changes. Fortuitously, I was at the time taking a 
course on China’s use of the past, studying how the CCP actively uses historical narratives to fit 
 For instance, see Joshua Berlinger, “North Korea’s Missile Tests: What You Need to Know,” CNN News, December 3, 2017, 137
accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html; and Jim Sciutto, Barbara 
Starr, and Zachary Cohen, “Trump Promises North Korea ‘Fire and Fury’ over Nuke Threat,” CNN Politics, August 9, 2017, 
accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/politics/north-korea-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons/index.html.
 See, for instance, Zhu Feng, “China’s North Korean Liability: How Washington Can Get Beijing to Rein In Pyongyang,” 138
Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2017, accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-07-11/chinas-
north-korean-liability.
 One example is Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated June 25, 2019, 139
accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.
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its political goals. Hence, I started to look into how China has crafted its historical narrative 
about North Korea, by studying the event that is credited to have founded the modern PRC-
DPRK relationship: the Korean War. 
 A number of primary sources came to my mind. My initial choice was publications on the 
history of the war, such as the History of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.  140
These books, most often compiled or approved by the Chinese military, no doubt offered a 
historical narrative of the Korean War curated directly by the government. However, most of 
these books were published in relatively recent years, with no publications during the 1960s and 
70s. Additionally, most of them were written by the military; I quickly realized that I did not 
have the relevant background knowledge to fully appreciate the provided military details and, 
even if I did, these would offer more tactical insights than strategic or political ones. 
 Another promising group of sources was memoirs by veterans or generals that 
participated in the war.  Most of these were published in the 1980s, spurred by the posthumous 141
rehabilitation of Peng Dehuai in 1978, leading Marshal of the PVA who was denounced for 
criticizing CCP policies during the Great Leap Forward.  These memoirs provided raw 142
accounts of the war, both on the battlefield and within government cabinets; the memoirs of 
generals also offered valuable insights into the decision-making process and strategic priorities 
of the CCP during watershed moments of the Korean War. These narratives, however, only 
 Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiusuo 军事科学院军事历史研究所 [Military History Unit of the Academy of Military 140
Sciences of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army], Kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzhengshi 抗美援朝战争史 [History of the War to 
Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], 3 vols (Beijing, China: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2014).
 Examples include Peng Dehuai 彭德怀, Peng Dehuai Zishu 彭德怀自述 [Peng Dehuai’s Memoir] (Beijing: Jiefangjun 141
chubanshe, 1981); Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu 聂荣臻回忆录 [Nie Rongzhen’s Memoirs] (Beijing: Jiefangjun 
chubanshe, 1984); and Cai Chengwen 柴成文, Banmendian Tanpan 板门店谈判 [Panmunjom Negotiations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun 
chubanshe, 1989). A major English translation of key leaders’ memoirs, albeit abridged, include Li Xiaobing, Allan Reed Millett, 
and Yu Bin, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001).
 Wanli Hu, Mao’s American Strategy and the Korean War (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008), 10; the Editors of 142
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. “Peng Dehuai,” last updated October 20, 2019, accessed November 20, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Peng-Dehuai.
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focused on the outbreak and immediate aftermaths of the war; the “afterlife” of it was rarely if 
ever included. Since these works were not published by the CCP, it was also unclear how 
reflective they were of the government’s official perspective. 
 These memoirs’ invocation of certain slogans or CCP leaders’ speeches, however, led me 
to another primary source—commemoration speeches by CCP leaders. Delivered by party 
leaders themselves, these speeches directly presented the official stance of the CCP, and often 
offered justifications and explained the military and political significance of the war. What 
distinguished these speeches, however, was the fact that these commemorative events were held 
relatively regularly since 1950. In terms of tracking the CCP’s interpretation of and political 
goals relevant to the Korean War over time, these speeches thus proved to be ideal primary 
sources. Since most of these speeches were widely circulated in the news, I also had easy access 
to these sources, thanks to Yale’s resources including the online archive of the People’s Daily. 
 Upon digging, however, I faced two main obstacles. First, in the People’s Daily, there 
was a visible dearth of Korean War commemoration events from the early 1960s to the late 80s, 
which made tracing the change of CCP stance over a continuous time frame rather difficult. 
More critical, however, was that my Chinese language skills, while capable of comprehending 
the speeches, were not high enough to digest decades’ worth of speeches at a reasonable speed. 
 To address these limitations, I took a gap year and enrolled in an intensive Chinese 
language program at Tsinghua University; with my improved Chinese skills, I also tried looking 
into more sources. I first attempted to access the Foreign Ministry Archive of the PRC, but was 
told that I would require a letter of recommendation from a Chinese local institution, which I did 
not have the means to acquire. Knowing that studies on historiography often use textbooks to 
understand how states craft standardized, “official” historical narratives, I also exhausted the 
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history textbook collection of the National Library of China, but its limitations were significant 
as well. Since mandatory education began during Deng Xiaoping’s years, this particular medium 
most likely did not reach a wide audience until at least the 1970s. The library’s incomplete 
collection of older textbooks, the variety of publishers, and multiple grade levels for history 
courses also made finding a comprehensive collection practically impossible. Lastly, since 
textbooks focused more on providing an overview of history than an in-depth study of one event, 
their coverage of the Korean War were insufficient in both volume and depth. 
 Faced with these limitations, I ultimately decided to focus on speeches. To complement 
the dearth of speeches in the People’s Daily, I added another publication—the People’s 
Liberation Army Daily—to the list. I also combed through the selected works by key leaders of 
the CCP to ensure the collection was as complete as possible. These measures led me to over a 
thousand articles, and I ended up trimming the list to focus on speeches that were designed for 
Chinese domestic audiences and, when there were multiple speeches for a given year, more 
weight was given to those delivered by higher-ranking CCP members. 
 Finding adequate secondary sources also proved to be a challenge. Since the war was 
interpreted differently by each country involved, I combined resources available at Yale, Korean 
national databases, and the National Library of China to get a more balanced overview. Some of 
these researches proved critical in formulating my research approach, a sample of which I 
highlight below. 
 While the Korean War itself has been extensively studied, the historical memory of the 
war is surprisingly under-researched, with the majority of English studies focusing instead on 
explaining the origin of the war and Chinese intervention. One promising work from this 
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category, however, was Allen Whiting’s 1960 book, China Crosses the Yalu, which inspired 
generations of Korean War scholars by notably disagreeing with the then-popular U.S. 
understanding of the Korean War as an ideological war and instead arguing that China’s 
intervention was driven primarily by security concerns, thus applying a realpolitik framework to 
the war.  Whiting’s book was significant not only in that it revealed a key strategic goal for the 143
CCP—protection of national interests in a non-ideological, realist sense—but also in its use of 
CCP propaganda material as its major primary source. That Whiting’s deduction of the CCP’s 
political goals came from propaganda speeches and news publications, and that later generations 
of studies on the Korean War have reinforced Whiting’s seminal analysis, confirmed my 
conviction that commemoration speeches can be used to accurately track the CCP’s objectives. 
 Another important group of works looks into the PRC-DPRK relations during the war 
and the immediately following years. Shen Zhihua’s works have been the most notable on this 
topic.  While Shen published a number of papers in this field, his most important work would 144
be his book with Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and Sino-
North Korean Relations. Here Shen and Xia trace the ups and downs of PRC-DPRK relations, 
marking watershed moments such as the death of Stalin and end of the Korean War, the purge of 
the Yan’an faction in DPRK by Kim in the mid 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split, and the detente 
 Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 159.143
 Some of these works include Shen Zhihua, “Zunzhong yu yuanzhu: xin Zhongguo dui Chaoxian waijiao fangzhen de 144
xingcheng (1950-1955)” 尊重与援助:新中国对朝鲜外交方针的形成(1950-1955) [Respect and Aid: The Formation of the New 
China’s Diplomatic Guideline for North Korea Relations, 1950 - 1955], Shixue Luntan 史学论坛, no. 6 (2015): 4-13; Shen 
Zhihua and Dong Jie, “Chaoxian zhanhou zhongjian yu Zhongguo de jingji yuanzhu (1954—1960)” 朝鲜战后重建与中国的经
济援助(1954—1960) [Post-War Reconstruction of the DPRK and Economic Aid from China (1954-1960)], Zhonggong Dangshi 
Yanjiu 中共党史研究, no. 3 (2011): 48-57; and Shen Zhihua, “Miandui lishi jiyu: ZhongMei guanxi hejie yu ZhongChao guanxi 
(1971—1974)” 面对历史机遇:中美关系和解与中朝关系(1971—1974) [Facing a Historical Opportunity: The Sino-U.S. 
Rapprochement and the Sino-North Korean Relations (1971—1974)], Journal of East China Normal University, no. 1 (2014): 
1-14. doi: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5579.2014.01.007.
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between China and the United States.  These works convinced me that PRC-DPRK relations 145
have changed significantly over time and that the CCP would have had to readjust its narrative 
about its relationship with DPRK, potentially through the Korean War. 
 A handful of studies focus on the war mobilization efforts and public reception of such 
movements during the 1950s. Hajimu Masuda, for instance, explores in his book Cold War 
Crucible how the concept of the Cold War became perceived and translated into reality, and how 
individual understandings of the Cold War were shaped by historical memories and experiences 
specific to a given nation.  Regarding the Korean War, Masuda demonstrates how the Chinese 146
people linked their bitterness toward the Japanese with their attitude toward the United States, 
and how that allowed for widespread war mobilization of the Chinese people.  Masuda’s study 147
also notes the Chinese people’s differing responses to the Korean War after its outbreak, and how 
the state and masses used mobilization efforts to eliminate social and political dissent, thereby 
solidifying their imagined reality of the Cold War. Masuda’s work offered insights into what 
domestic political pressure the CCP wanted to address during this period, which in turn allowed 
for comparison of the CCP’s political objectives and propaganda messages between then and 
later years. 
 There were a few studies that directly addressed the CCP’s commemoration of the 
Korean War, which formed the foundation of my analysis of Korean War commemoration 
speeches. Studies on Chinese textbook portrayals of Korea highlighted for me shifts in China’s 
historical narrative over time, with watershed moments including U.S.-PRC normalizations and 
 Shen Zhihua, and Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations, 145
1949-1976 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018), 4-5.
 Hajimu Masuda, Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 146
University Press, 2015).
 Ibid.147
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South Korea’s rapid economic development.  Jung Keun-Sik’s study of the Memorial of the 148
War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea gave me more clarity in some political goals that 
the CCP was trying to accomplish through its Korean War narrative, such as state formation, 
nation building, and positioning China as a world power and legitimate challenger of the United 
States.  From these works, I learned what political and propagandistic value the CCP has 149
attached to the Korean War, and familiarized myself with watershed events that influenced the 
Korean War narrative in other sources, which allowed me to compare these narratives to the 
changes (and lack thereof) observed in that of commemoration speeches. 
 Besides primary and secondary sources, there is another source of guidance which was as 
important as, if not more important than, my research material. I am incredibly grateful to 
Professor Denise Ho, whose instructions, guidance, and advice made possible not only this 
senior essay but also my growth as a writer and a student of history. My journey as a History 
major would not have been possible without Professor Fabian Drixler, whose academic advice 
and guidance have been invaluable throughout my time at Yale. I am thankful for the generous 
support by the Richard U. Light Fellowship that made my three terms in China possible. Last but 
not least, I am infinitely grateful to my family and friends, who have been an unwavering source 
of encouragement and support—across multiple time zones, from Seoul to New Haven, through 
thick and thin—without which this thesis would have been impossible. 
 Woo Sung-min, “Singan Jungguk jungdeung yeoksagyogwaseo gaepyeon donghyangui teukjinggwa hanguksa gwallyeon 148
seosul geomto” 신간 중국 중등 역사교과서 개편 동향의 특징과 한국사 관련 서술 검토 [A Study of the Characteristics of a 
Middle School History Textbook Reform in China and Reviewing Descriptions of Korean History], The Journal of Chinese 
Studies 86 (November 2018): 395-430; Yu, Yong-Tae 유용태, “Jungguk yeoksagyogwaseoui hyeondaesa insikgwa gukgajuui: 
hyeondae hanguksareul jungsimeuro” 중국 역사교과서의 현대사 인식과 국가주의: 현대 한국사를 중심으로 [Modern 
History Awareness and Nationalism in Chinese History Textbooks: Focusing on Modern Korean History], The Korean History 
Education Review 84 (December 2002): 187-222.
 Jung Keun-Sik, “China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U.S. 149
Aggression and Aid Korea,’” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, no. 14 (March 2015), 63-90.
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